



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

of any kind" was forbidden, together with "distilled liquors or any composition made therewith." The rooms of commencers were visited by the president and corporation, and contraband articles which were found were seized and fines imposed on the unlucky students. What would a Harvard student of the year 1889 think of a warning against violating the above decree by the use of "plain cake," the penalty actually being the withholding of the degree, or, if the degree had already been given, the name was to be left out of or "rased from the catalogue of the graduates."

As late as 1753 the overseers of the college recommended the corporation "to restrain unsuitable and unseasonable dancing." At one period Friday was fixed upon for commencement day, in order that there might be less remaining time in the week to be spent in frolicking. This decree, depriving the young people in the vicinity of a much-enjoyed holiday, was, however, soon reversed.

Very little respect seems to have existed for the judgment of the students, and President Mather writes of his reluctance to leave off preaching to a congregation of over one thousand souls, such as constituted his Boston church, and to devote his time, instead, to the exposition of the Word to "forty or fifty children, few of them capable of edification," by such exercises as the reverend president's tough theological discourses.

Regulations concerning students' commons were of similar severity, and in President Dunster's time the relations between the students and the butler, cook, and steward were established by a code of laws. The steward was relieved from the necessity of taking, in payment for debt, any pay "useless, hazardous, or importing detriment to the college, as lean cattle to feed, etc." No student, without the permission of the president or, in his absence, of the senior fellow, might leave the hall at meal-time before thanksgiving was ended. And one can easily imagine that a young man of lively disposition would need to exercise his wits to the utmost in order to provide any amusement beyond what could be found in the study of Greek, Hebrew, and Latin.

HELEN MARSHALL NORTH.

IV.

CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM AGAIN.

GENERAL JOHN POPE, in the September number of this REVIEW, declares that "the fact that any such system [of civil service] worked well in France or Germany or England would not only *not* be presumptive evidence that it would suit us, but actual proof that it would not." The reform of the civil service is but a logical step in the political development of England. The old system in England and in the United States was founded on the theory that public offices are the property of the ruler, and the experience of both countries shows conclusively how the radical vices of that system can be corrected. If the successful issue of the administrative method in England is conclusive evidence that it is not adapted to this country, then we should expunge from our constitution the theory of executive power, the division of government into three great departments with well-defined jurisdictions, two houses of legislation, with the whole body of parliamentary law, trial by jury, habeas corpus, the common law, with its vast stores of wisdom extending to all business and all personal relations, the long series of statutes so far as not repugnant to our system, criminal definitions and procedure, the theory of military as subordinate to civil authority, the political conception of domestic and individual rights and duties, drawn from the same source from which flowed our blood, language, and civilization. The science of administration has made much greater progress in Great Britain than in the United States, striking deeper into the social life and political system. The merit system has proved highly successful in the Federal administration as well as in the States of New York and Massachusetts, and in the great municipalities of New York, Brooklyn, Boston, and many others. The fact that any principles of political action have been found salutary in one country is by no means a sufficient reason for introducing them into another. The probability that they may be salutary increases with all that is in common in the race of language,

religion, laws, institutions, and civilization. Because found salutary in England it by no means follows that this system is not republican in spirit and consistent with the practical administration of government under our institutions.

General Pope declares that there cannot be "a greater or more misleading fallacy than the oft-repeated saying that 'the business of the government should be conducted on business methods.'" The vast clerical force at Washington and in the large offices throughout the country are not representative officers, and there is no sphere for partisan activity or opinions in the honest and faithful performance of their work. A department, custom-house, or post-office is a mere business agency for the transaction of the business of the whole people economically and efficiently, and it should be conducted by the same business methods, no matter which party is in power.

General Pope speaks of an "order or a law"—he does not seem to know which—that deprives one hundred thousand citizens of all participation in public affairs except what is covered by a mere vote; says that they are practically disfranchised and deprived of half their rights and duties as citizens, and that they are political eunuchs, incapacitated for the duties of good citizens. The Civil-Service Act and rules, on the contrary, give independence and full liberty to office-holders to express opinions and exercise the duties of citizenship by forbidding removals for refusing to pay political assessments, or for refusal to be coerced in political action, or for refusal to render political service. The only "order or law" which General Pope could have had in mind must have been an order issued by President Cleveland, which declared that "office-holders are the agents of the people—not their masters."

Party government and the salutary activity of parties are thus made purer and more efficient. The authority and time of officials should not be prostituted to the servile work of partisan politics, and political assessments extorted under the fear of removal. Every honest interest and zeal in political contests are open to every office-holder under the merit system.

General Pope advances the novel suggestion that the Representative in Congress is the person whose recommendation should carry most weight in appointments to public office. In 1869 a Representative said in a debate in the House: "It is no more a part of a Representative's duty to seek and dispose of executive offices than to solicit pardons for traitors or condemned criminals." In a debate in 1870 another Representative said: "I appeal to the members of the House if it is not one of the greatest curses of the position of a member of Congress that there are continual demands made on his time and patience by persons whom it is utterly impossible for him to satisfy, who demand that he shall secure offices for them." The chief labor of the President, collectors, and postmasters has been to reward the personal friends and punish the personal foes of the leaders of the dominant faction of the dominant party. To consult Congressmen in appointments is to ignore the motives that rule human conduct in practical affairs. Without patronage Congressmen may represent the will of the people, but with it they do not.

In March, 1870, Mr. Garfield said in the House of Representatives: "We press appointments upon the departments; we crowd the doors. . . . Senators and Representatives throng the offices and the bureaus until the public business is obstructed, . . . and men are appointed, not because they are fit for their positions, but because we ask it. . . . There, Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, is the true field for retrenchment and reform; . . . in this direction is the true line of statesmanship." Seven years later, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Mr. Garfield said that "one-third of the working hours of Senators is hardly sufficient to meet the demands upon them in reference to appointments. . . . The present system impairs the efficiency of the legislators; . . . it degrades the civil service; . . . it repels from the service those high and manly qualities which are so essential to a pure and efficient administration; and, finally, it debauches the public mind by holding up public office as the mere reward of party zeal." In his message in 1870 President Grant said: "The present system does not secure the best men, and not often fit men, for the public service." A committee of the Senate in 1882 said: "The malign influence of political domination in appointments to office is widespread, and reaches out from the

President himself to all possible means of approach to the appointing power. It poisons the very air we breathe. No Congressman in accord with the dispenser of power can escape it. . . . The late Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Windom, is reported to have said that five-sixths of the applicants for office, while he administered the Treasury, based their claims, not on merits, fitness, or character, but on their poverty and incapacity to otherwise obtain a livelihood."

General Pope would aggravate the administrative disorder which prevails in the United States by giving a monopoly of office and plunder to the victorious party, allowing an irresponsible body dominated by professional office-seekers and office-holders to usurp the election of President, and by having appointments to places outside of Washington made on the recommendation of the local Congressman, to the confusion of executive and legislative functions, of Federal and State authority, besides being impracticable, even according to General Pope's theory, as some of the Congressmen "would oppose the policies which the people commanded to be carried out," and not be fit instruments. Kent, in his "Commentaries," is of the opinion that the President's power of nomination is, for all the useful purposes of restraint, equivalent to the power of appointment, and that, if the President were not expressly invested with the exclusive right of nomination, the organization of the executive department would be very unskilful, and the government degenerate into a system of cabal, favoritism, and intrigue.

Some of the evils of patronage have been suppressed by Congress and the Executive. The tenth section of the Civil-Service Act of January 16, 1883, declares that "no recommendation of any person who shall apply for office or place under the provisions of this act, which may be given by any Senator or Member of the House of Representatives, except as to the character or residence of the applicant, shall be received or considered by any person concerned in making any examination or appointment under this act." The President has made, in the civil-service rules, the use of official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or controlling the result thereof, punishable by dismissal from office; and declared that "any appointing or nominating officer who shall make inquiries concerning, or in any other way attempt to ascertain, the political or religious opinion or affiliations of any eligible, or who shall discriminate in favor of or against any eligible because of the eligible's political or religious opinions or affiliations, shall be dismissed from office." The rules also provide that selections for appointments shall be made from the three highest in grade certified for appointment on the basis of merit shown on the examinations.

William H. Seward, in his life of John Quincy Adams, describes the opposition to the administration of Mr. Adams as more determined, bitter, and unscrupulous than any which has ever assailed a President of the United States; but yet he says of him: "His views of the sacred nature of the trust imposed upon him by his fellow-citizens were too exalted to allow him to desecrate the power with which it clothed him to the promotion of party or personal interests. . . . Neither did an opposition to his administration alone, except there was a marked practical unfitness for office, ever induce him to remove an individual from a public station."

It is needless to multiply quotations. The merit system commends itself as republican in spirit and the only sound basis for an efficient and economical public service. The old spoils system is doomed. The competitive system is fixed as a part of our institutions as permanent as it is salutary. Within the sphere of the system, Congress and appointing officers have been relieved of demoralizing solicitation, and vicious intrigues and bargains for office are diminished. Twenty-eight thousand places are no longer spoils to be promised for votes or as rewards for partisan work. The public estimate of official life has been raised. Office is being more and more regarded as a public trust. The cause of public-school education has been greatly advanced. Hence sounder principles and superior candidates have become more necessary to party success.

JOHN T. DOYLE.